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A COTMPARATIVE SURVEY OF POST-REPEAL LIQUOR LEGISLATION '--The
overthrow of national prohibition by the ratification of the Twenty-first Amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution has invested the individual states with the right
to function once again as forty-eight experimental laboratories in the field of
liquor control.2  After a respite of thirteen years the majority of the states have
plunged headlong into the alchemy of legislation to seek the magic formula with
which to cure the social ills caused by the traffic in intoxicating liquor.3 The
alacrity with which the lawmaking bodies throughout the country have responded
to the mandate of public feeling against complete prohibition has served to con-
found those who decry the lethargy which invariably marks the response of
legislatures to the stimulus of public sentiment. Within a single year after the
return of the control of the liquor traffic to the states all but eight of them had
taken steps to cope with the situation so suddenly thrust upon them.' The parade
of liquor legislation stopped not even at the barrier of state constitutional pro-
hibition. So impelling was the urge of acceding to the popular clamor for lib-
eralized liquor laws in Kentucky that the existence of a constitutional inhibition
against the use of intoxicating liquor was not regarded as fatal. Under the guise
of allowing the use of intoxicating liquor for medicinal purposes only the liquor
traffic was legalized, and through the ingenious expedient of casting each citizen
in the r6le of his own personal physician with the power of diagnosing his own
ills and prescribing the curative of liquor, the general public was encouraged to
participate actively in the state-wide health scheme.'
As in the pre-national prohibition era, legislative attempts to cope with the
problem run the entire gamut of control schemes, from the indulgent local license
system with minimized restrictions on liquor sales I to the strongly paternalistic
i. A list of the statutes to be considered in this note, with full citations, will be found in
the Appendix. References in subsequent footnotes will be made by naming the state and the
appropriate section of the statute.
2. The Twenty-first Amendment not only repeals the Eighteenth Amendment but also
provides for protection of the dry states in the following terms: "The transportation or im-
portation into any State, Territory or possession of the United States for delivery or use
therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." The
inability of the dry states effectively to enforce their dry laws because of lack of power to
control interstate shipments of liquor was long a source of much agitation before national
prohibition. The language of the Twenty-first Amendment, however, merely confirms the
state of the law at the time national prohibition went into effect since the Webb-Kenyon Act
enacted in 1913 by Congress had divested liquor of its interstate character. For a review
of the statutes and decisions on this question see Note (1919) 19 COL. L. REV. 140.
3. Thirty states have enacted liquor control statutes. See Appendix. The Mississippi
control statute was rejected by the electorate on July 10, 1934. In a number of other states
constitutional restrictions have been repealed by popular referenda, and the legislatures are
expected to take action in the near future. Among these states are Florida, Idaho, Nebraska,
South Dakota, Utah and Wyoming. In many of the remaining states liberalizing movements
are under way.
4. Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and
Utah have not as yet taken any action to repeal existing dry laws. Three others, Arizona,
Nevada and Florida, allow liquor sales under old laws.
5. Among the reasons given for the passage of the act are the existence of bootlegging,
moonshining, poisoned liquor and the exorbitant prices being charged for good liquor (§ i).
Sales of liquor are allowed by the drink in hotels, restaurants and clubs without the need of
a "prescription" (§ 12).
6. The Louisiana statute confines itself to revenue measures, leaving matters of control
to the local subdivisions.
(51O)
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state monopoly, 7 with innumerable variations between the two extremes. The
federal government has intensified this bewildering state of affairs by contrib-
uting a separate tax statute 8 as well as its own regulatory body-the Federal
Alcohol Control Administration-whose regulations frequently run counter to
the express provisions of local statutes.
From an analysis of this maze of widely divergent statutory provisions,
however, it becomes apparent that the opinions of those interested in the social
aspects of liquor control 10 have played an important part in devising statutory
safeguards against the more serious evils attendant upon an uncontrolled liquor
traffic. Post-repeal statutes, regardless of the broad system of control adopted,
have incorporated a variety of provisions which aim directly at checking the
abuses resulting from overindulgence in the stronger liquors, stamping out the
traditional saloon in its character of a breeding place for intemperance and law-
lessness, and the elimination of the once unholy alliance between politics and the
liquor interests."
As contrasted with the liquor legislation of past years the most striking
development of present day laws is the trend toward control by means of the
monopoly, or state dispensing system, 12 by which the state actually participates
in one or more phases of the liquor business, rather than being content with a
mere supervisory function-as under the licensing system. Aside from this
fundamental distinction, however, the two systems often meet on common
ground, the major differences arising from the variations in the methods em-
ployed to achieve identical results. Under every system a varying degree of
power is invested in a state governing body. While in some states existing state
agencies have been utilized for this purpose, 13 and in others ex officio boards
have been created,'14 most states have attempted to isolate the administration of
the liquor traffic by erecting special bodies for this purpose. Membership on
these boards vary from a single member to five, although a board of three is
encountered most frequently. 15 Tenure of office is usually fixed by statute,
thereby giving the members a measure of freedom from external forces,', and
ranges from three to nine years." Provision for overlapping terms to insure
7. Iowa permits only beer to be sold by private dealers.
8. P. L. No. 43, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 26 U. S. C. A. c. 5 (Supp. 1934).
9. A striking example of this is the conflict created by the regulation of the federal body
prohibiting the purchase of liquor on consignment while the Ohio statute (§ 6o64-12) specifi-
cally ahows the commission to buy on consignment.
to. See, for example, FOSDICK AND SCOTT, TOWARD LIQUOR CONTROL (1933) (an excel-
lent survey of the various systems of liquor control) ; Future Legislative Policy [Report of
the Legal and Legislative Departments, Anti-Saloon League of America (1934)A. For a
proposed model act see 23 NAT. MUN. REv. (Supp.) 62 (1934).
it. The following statement found in the Oregon control act (§ 2) is typical of like
stat ments found in many of the new statutes: "This act shall be deemed an exercise of the
police powers . . . to prevent the recurrence of abuses associated with saloons . . . to
elimnate the evils of ... unlawful manufacture .. . and to promote temperance.. .
12. This plan has been adopted in Delaware, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Montana, New
Hampshire, Ohio, Oregon, Vermont, Virginia and Washington.
13. California (§ 5), Kentucky (art. III), Maryland (§ 3), Wisconsin (§ 176.o3).
14. Montana (Q 4-governor, attorney general and secretary of state) ; New Mexico (§ 9
-secretary of state, attorney general and director of public health). Michigan (§35) has
a hybrid commission, three of its members being appointed, two being members ex of cio.
15. Delaware ( 4), Indiana (§ 3727), Missouri (§ 2) and New Jersey (c. 436, § 3) have
one-man boards; Michigan (35), New York (§ io) and Rhode Island (§7) have five mem-
bers; Ohio (§ 2) has four members; the remaining states have three-man boards.
16. Missouri (§ 2) is exceptional in providing that the comm:ssioner serve at the pleas-
ure of the governor. Indiana (§ 3727) provides that appointments be made for a term not in
excess of 4 years.
17. Most states provide for 6 year terms; Massachusetts (§ i) and Michigan (§ 5) pro-
vide 3 year terms; Montana (§ 4) provides for the longest term, 9 years.
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stability of policy and personnel is common. Salaries for the most part, in the
specially created boards, seem sufficiently large to attract men of high caliber,
Where the control bodies are given wide powers, members are required to devote
their entire time to their duties on the board and are prohibited from holding
other public offices or from maintaining any connection with any phase of the
private liquor traffic, including shareholdership in liquor concerns.10 The feeling
against politically entangled control commissions is faintly noticeable in statutes
vesting the power of appointment in the chief executive of the state, although
more frequently the concurrence of the legislature is required.20  A single state
provides for full power in this respect to rest in the legislature..2 1 The invariable
stipulation for bi-partisan membership on the commissions would seem merely
to distribute rather than prevent political appointments. Provisions which
actually aim at a non-political administration of the liquor problem are rare.
Highly exceptional are the Michigan provision 22 which disqualifies an appointee
who has solicited an endorsement from a member of the legislature, and the
Iowa section 23 which prohibits a member fron contributing to campaign funds,
serving on a political committee or using his influence to persuade anyone to
adopt his political views. At the opposite extreme is the Rhode Island re-
quirement 24 that the Governor select the members of the control board from
lists submitted by heads of the respective political parties. The notable omis-
sions to adopt more stringent safeguards in this respect assume added signifi-
cance in the light of the ignominious failure of the early South Carolina experi-
ment in state liquor control-admittedly occasioned in a large measure by
political corruption.2 5
Under both the monopoly and license statutes the control bodies have been
granted a wide variety of powers. In general, however, those bodies which
are to function under the monopoly system of control have been given more
extensive powers-and, with few exceptions, exclusive regulatory powers.2
The latter feature is less frequently found in the statutes which have adopted
the license plan of control, the regulatory and licensing powers, in most cases,
being divided between the state and local bodies.2 7 This feature is unfortunate
if the purpose of these statutes is to create a non-political and, what is more
important here, a centralized and efficient body for the entire state. The larg-
est group of statutes, both of the monopoly and license variety, provide for the
18. Members of the Pennsylvania Control Commission, for example, receive $io,ooo an-
nually (§ 744-9O2).
19. The Pennsylvania act (§ 744-607) is typical in providing that "(a) A member or
employe of the board shall not be, directly or indirectly, interested or engaged in any other
business or undertaking dealing in liquor, whether as owner, part owner, partner, member of
syndicate, shareholder, agent or employe, and whether for his own benefit or in a fiduciary
capacity. . ..
20. Connecticut (§671b), Delaware (§4-1-7), Illinois (art. 3, § i), Indiana (§3727),
Oregon (§ 4), Virginia (§ 3b) and Washington (§ 63) give the governor complete authority.
21. New Jersey (c. 436, § 3).
22. § 5.
23. § 5. This provision applies as well to employees of the commission.
24. §7.
25. See Sherard, South Carolina's State Liquor Control (1931) 35 CURRENT HISTORY 69.
The state system was inaugurated in 1893; members of the commission were appointed by
the legislature. This system was abolished in 1907. Governor Pinchot of Pennsylvania, in
an address reprinted in 44 ROTARIAN 12 (2934) makes much of the fact that the managers of
the state dispensaries were paid on a commission basis. It is interesting to note that of the
modern liquor legislation only the Mississippi act (§ io) (repealed) contained such provision.
26. The state boards of only Vermont (§§ 18, ig) and Virginia (§ 26) of the monopoly
states share their powers with local authorities.
27. Only six of the license states (Arizona [full power placed in the tax commissioner],
California [§ 5], Colorado [§ 2o], Connecticut [§ 677b], Indiana [§ 3728] and Kentucky [art.
III, §§ I, 3]) grant their control bodies exclusive powers.
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following powers to be exercised by the regulatory bodies: grant, refuse and
revoke licenses, with provisions for public hearings and right of appeal; conduct
hearings and investigations; issue subpcenas and compel testimony; promulgate
regulations within the limits of the statute, including the general conduct of the
numerous phases of the liquor traffic; and general police power to enforce the
act and the regulations made under it. Powers of local authorities vary con-
siderably. At one extreme is a law allowing county boards to establish municipal
liquor stores; 28 at the other extreme the local authority functions as an admin-
istrative arm of the higher state authority, with the power to grant retail
licenses subject to the approval of the state board.29 Others place the licensing
power in the state authority, but subject to the approval of the local boards.80
Both of the latter methods of issuing licenses would seem well adapted to effec-
tuating the purpose of licensing only reputable dealers since such matters are
best known in the communities where the applicants desire to engage in busi-
ness. This point is further emphasized by provisions which stipulate as a con-
dition precedent to receiving a license that the applicant reside in the community
for a fixed period of time. Local authorities are also permitted to establish
rules in regard to the conduct of the retail trade which range between com-
plete power in this respect to a limited power to further qualify the regulations
issued by the state authority.3 ' Many states permit the local bodies to levy
license taxes concurrently with the state authority; others grant the local bodies
the sole right to do so.
The impelling motive underlying the adoption of the monopoly or state
authority plan of control is the eradication of the more vicious aspects of the
private liquor traffic through the elimination of private profit. It is claimed by
the proponents of this plan that only through removing the incentive to increase
sales can there be any decrease in the artificial stimulation of liquor sales.
8 2
Nowhere, however, in this country is this theory carried to its logical extreme
inasmuch as no state has attempted to create a complete state monopoly. Most
monopoly states while retaining the exclusive right to establish a chain of retail
stores where liquor is sold only in packages and not for consumption on the prem-
ises allow such consumption on the premises of private licensed dealers.32 The
nearest approach to a complete monopoly of the liquor business is offered by
the Virginia statute which limits the private sale to beer and further permits
the control commission to engage in the manufacture of liquor. One other
state draws the line at rectifying and blending by the state authority.34 It is
therefore obvious that private profit from liquor sales is not eliminated even in
the strongest monopoly state; but the basic theory of unstimulated sales is fur-
thered by a variety of supporting provisions. No credit will be extended a pur-
chaser. All sales must be made according to a standard price scale, thereby
eliminating stimulation of sales through competitive price cutting. Managers
and employees of the state dispensaries are provided with no incentive to increase
the volume of sales since most statutes specifically stipulate that their compen-
28. Minnesota ( 32oo-2-58y).
29. Minnesota ( 3200-25.)
3o. In New York (§ 17, 43) the state control commission will act upon the recommenda-
tion of local bodies in regard to granting or revoking licenses.
31. Local bodies in Rhode Island (0 12) and Illinois (art. IV, §§ I, 2) have full power
to issue licenses, and to make regulations.
32. See FOSDICK AND ScoTT, TOWARD LIQUOR CONTROL (1933) c. 3.
33. Delaware (§ 17), Michigan (§ ig), Ohio (§ 6064-15), Pennsylvania (§ 744-411),
Vermont (Q i5) and Washington (§ 23) allow private on-sales of all liquor. Oregon (§ 16)
and Virginia (§ 18) restrict this to beer and wine. Montana (§ 9 (22), 14) and Iowa (c.
24, § I, c. 25, § 5) allow private sales of beer only.
34. Delaware ( 14 (3)). Ohio (§ 6064-8 (3)) also permits the control commission to
operate a distillery but allows private sales of all liquor.
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sation be fixed on a non-commission basis.35 Logically this principle is ex-
tended also to the compensation of special agents appointed in lieu of state
stores where the establishment of such a store is not deemed necessary."6
There the agent is limited to a fixed salary and may receive no profit from the
sale of liquor by him. In fact, he may be induced to discourage large sales since
a large demand will cause his agency to be revoked in favor of a state store.
Nor, for the same general reasons, may an employee of the state system acquire
any financial interest in the private liquor business. State dispensaries are
commonly prohibited the use of advertising or window displays to stimulate
sales, although this provision seems absurd where private dealers are not sub-
jected to the same restriction, which is the case under one statute" and may
possibly be so under another depending upon the action taken by the commis-
sionA5 Another feature of the state authority system as created in some few
of the states is elimination of unlimited private profit by the requirement that
private dealers may purchase liquor only from the state system. They are
allowed a comparatively small discount from the general retail price," and in
one state can buy only at the retail price. 40  Thus the state store, although sell-
ing liquor only in packages is an active competitor of the retailer who sells for
consumption on the premises, with the result that prices charged by the pri-
vate retailer will not yield large profits as compared to the possibilities under
the private licensing system. It is important to note in this respect that many
of the states, while adopting the main features of the licensing system, have
emulated the provisions of the monopoly plan in varying degrees. Minnesota
and Maryland, although remaining aloof from any participation in the liquor
traffic, have adopted the theory of the state authority plan to the extent of
allowing local authorities to establish municipal dispensaries. Curiously enough,
the Minnesota statute goes further in this respect than the most inclusive state
monopoly by allowing municipal dispensaries to sell for consumption on the
premises as well as in packages. 41  That the legislators in both Rhode Island
and Massachusetts were impressed with the monopoly theory of unstimulated
sales through the elimination of private profit is evidenced by -statutory provi-
sions permitting the state commission to establish maximum wholesale and
retail prices respectively. The Minnesota legislature exhibits a tendency to fall
in line by the incorporation in its statute of a unique section which reserves to
itself the right at any time to limit the profits of any manufacturer, wholesaler
or retailer. Some few license statutes, like those of the monopoly type, pro-
hibit charge or credit sales.
42
Since sales for consumption on the premises of private licensees may be
made under both license and state authority statutes, restrictions placed upon
such sales may be examined together. Outstanding among these restrictions are
those which have as their purpose the abolition, at least in regard to physical
characteristics, of the saloon or its modern counterpart, the speakeasy. Drink-
ers are now faced with the unhappy prospect of choosing between imbibing in
the privacy of the home or satisfying their thirsts in full view of a gaping
public, for no longer may the interior of a drinking establishment be concealed
from public view by obstructions such as blinds, screens, frosted glass or even
35. See supra note 25.
36. The Iowa (c. 24, § IO), Michigan (§ 14) and Ohio (§ 6064-11) statutes contain this
provision.
37. The Washington statute (§ 43) merely prohibits advertising by the commission.
38. The Oregon statute (§ 14) specifies that there be no advertising in state stores and
places advertising by private dealers under the supervision of the commission.
39. Michigan (§ j6) allows a 15% discount to dealers.
40. Washington (§ 4).
41. § 3200-25.
42. Illinois (§ 13) and Massachusetts (§ 12).
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the celebrated and time-honored swinging doors.
43 Nor may the identity of
drinkers be concealed nor an atmosphere conducive to drinking be created by
the use of dimmed lights, 44 enclosed booths or stalls, or the traditional "back
room".Y' Of special interest to the observer of the changing American scene
is the nearly universal blacklisting of the traditional bar 4' and its replacement
by eminently respectable, but less colorful, tables and chairs.
In general, modern legislation represents an effort to discourage abusive
drinking of liquor by permitting its sale only in respectable and sanitary sur-
roundings, where the prospective drinker is confronted with a minimum of
sales-stimulating devices. Licenses for the sale of the stronger alcoholic bev-
erages are restricted to bona fide hotels and restaurants, the primary business
of which is the preparation and service of cooked meals to the public.
4 7  Fre-
quently encountered are provisions which require a minimum number of sleep-
ing rooms for a hotel, adequate and sanitary facilities for the preparation of
meals, and that the establishment realize the principal portion of its revenue
from the sale of meals and/or lodging.4s Although in most states liquor may
be served only on premises where meals can be bought, only a minority of these
states require that liquor may be served and drunk only with meals.
49  In all,
however, only patrons seated at tables may be served.50 In some of the states
which require the patron to take food with his drink, some few legislatures,
forewarned by the ease with which this type of restriction was practically nullified
in pre-prohibition days,5 ' have endeavored to forearm themselves by setting
definite limits to the definition of "meal". Besides the general use of the terms
"cooked" or "hot" in reference to food, one state has further provided that
sandwiches and salads do not constitute a meal,52 while in Montana a patron
who has ordered food the value of which does not total twenty-five cents will
discover that he has not ordered a meal, and will therefore not be permitted to
order liquor with his food.
53
Another method intended to encourage temperance is the grant of special
privileges to associations organized for social, fraternal or other purposes of
43. This type of provision is encountered in practically all statutes. See, for example, the
New York statute (§ io6) which specifically designates swinging doors along with curtains,
blinds, etc.
44. It is usually required that the premises be well lighted. The Illinois statute (art.
VI, § 20) requires "white or natural light".
45. The last provision usually takes the form of a prohibition against any connecting
passages between that part of the premises where liquor is sold and other parts of the same
or adjoining premises. Connecticut (§ 7066) and Illinois (art. VI, § 9) have incorporated
such provisions.
46. Consumption while standing at a bar is expressly forbidden in most states, as in Colo-
rado (§ 8), Illinois (§ 21) and Massachusetts (§ 12). In many states, as in Pennsylvania, the
modern equivalent of a bar in the form of a lunch counter distinguished by permanently at-
tached stools is permitted. The New York statute [art. 8, § 100 (4)] permits each drinking
establishment to contain a single bar so long as that bar is not a "predominant" fixture of the
place.
47. The Michigan statute (§ 2), for example, defines a restaurant as a place, where hot
meals are babitually served to the public and specifically excludes candy or drug stores from
this category.
48. Among these states are Kentucky (art. III), Maryland (§ i) and Wisconsin
(§176.oi).
49. California (§ ), Illlinois (§21), Iowa (§ 15 of Beer Act), Kentucky (§ 12), New
Mexico (§ 5) and Oregon (§ 20) are among those states which allow liquor to be served only
with meals.
5o. Section I of the Massachusetts statute provides that patrons in taverns may drink
only while seated in view of all other patrons.
5I. Many will recall the custom, prevalent in New York, of including a permanent sand-
wich as part of the regular table equipment.
52. The statutes of Michigan (§ 2) and New York (art. I, § 3) also include this Dro-
vision, although food need not be ordered with liquor.
53. Montana (§ 2 (g)).
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like nature, presumably in the hope of fostering temperate, semi-private drink-
ing among homogeneous groups. These "clubs" are usually granted licenses
which permit drinking on the same scale or manner as the most highly privileged
licenses allowed in a particular state, and frequently upon payment of a smaller
license fee and qualified by fewer restrictions in regard to the manner of sale."
Incorporated in most laws, however, are stipulations designed to prevent the
utilization of club charters for the conduct of privileged, public drinking estab-
lishments.5 5 With a single exception,5 6 the purposes for which a club may be
chartered exclude pecuniary gain. Many states further require that revenue
from sources other than the sale of liquor be ample to defray the fiscal expenses
of the organization."' Nor may those who conduct the affairs of the club realize
any financial gain from the sale of liquor beyond a reasonable and pre-deter-
mined salary.58 A provision frequently found in the statutes requires the club
to maintain at all times with the control body a list of all members.5 9
In line with the discouragement of abusive drinking by confining public
drinking to bona fide food-selling establishments, a variety of statutory provi-
sions are concerned with the elimination of sales-stimulating devices. Many
statutes prohibit gratuitous drinks "on the house" '0 or even gifts of food or
other things of value such as premiums in connection with the sale of liquor,0 1
although, strangely enough, but one state has outlawed the hallowed custom of
"treating" in spite of the fact that the opponents of the saloon have condemned
this feature as being one of the most vicious fostered by that institution. 2 Stat-
utes uniformly provide for a period of time in each day during which liquor
may not be sold so that continued "soaking" may be eliminated. None has gone
as far, however, in this respect as has been done in England, where even within
the briefer time allowed licensed establishments to sell liquor a "rest period"
of two hours is required. 3 In few localities are Sunday or holiday sales per-
mitted,"6 and in all states no liquor may be sold on election days. In most
states, either by express statutory provision or by authority granted the control
bodies, a limit is or may be imposed upon the number of licenses which may
be issued in any one locality c5 Many states also prescribe the maximum amount
54. In Pennsylvania (§ 744-4o7), for example, whereas license fees for hotels and restau-
rants range between $15O and $6oo, depending upon the size of the town or city where the
establishment is located, a club license is uniformly fixd at $5o (§ 744-411). In Indiana ho-
tels and restaurants may serve liquor only in connection with meals; clubs are unimpeded by
this restriction (see § 3734).
55. The Pennsylvania act (§ 744-407) is unique in providing that clubs be subject to the
same license fees as hotels and restaurants where they "cater to large groups of non-members."
56. Delaware (§ 3 (7)).
57. Michigan (§2).
58. Connecticut (§ 67ob (8)), Massachusetts (§I), Michigan (§2) and Minnesota
(§ 3200-21).
59. Connecticut (§ 67ob (8)), Montana (§ 2 (k)) and Vermont (§ 2).
6o. The Michigan statute (§ 29) provides that no licensee shall give away liquor in con-
vection with his business.
61. Michigan (§ 27), Ohio (§ 6o64-24) and Pennsylvania (§ 744-6o4). The New Jersey
statute (c. 436, § 36) gives the control commission the power to make regulations in this re-
spect. The Iowa statute (§ iS of the Beer Act) forbids the giving away of food except
pretzels, crackers and cheese. In Wisconsin no licensee may give away any free lunch or
meals except popcorn, cheese, crackers, pretzels, sausage, fish or bread and butter.
62. Delaware (§ 17 (5)).
63. See Carter, The Drink Problem in England (1932) AxNALS 163, 197.
64. Connecticut (§ 73ob), New Jersey (§ 41) and New York (§ io6-5) permit restricted
Sunday sales.
65. Minnesota (§ 3200-25), for example, limits the number of licenses for each locality
in accordance with the population therein.
LEGISLATION
of liquor which may be purchased at one time or over a fixed period of time."
In those states operating under the license system licenses for sale by package and
those for consumption on the premises are rarely permitted to be utilized under
a single roof. Little uniformity, however, exists among the requirements in
regard to sale of unrelated merchandise under package sale licenses. One group
of states prohibits the licensee from engaging in any other type of business on
the premises; 11 another makes it mandatory that other merchandise be sold
there; Is a third allows off-sale licenses with no provision in this respect, thereby
allowing either type of establishment by indirection.
Most important among provisions effectuating the general feeling against
artificial sales stimulation are those restricting the use of advertising. Of these
states many invest the control authority with the power to regulate advertising
as it deems necessary, 69 while other statutes prescribe a variety of restrictions
irrespective of regulations made by the commission." Frequently signs are
declared to be unlawful if they contain words nmwh in se such as "bar" or
"saloon". 71 Advertising is often permitted for wines and beers while prohibited
for the stronger beverages.7 2  Closely related to the advertising provisions are
the companion restrictions against the soliciting of sales from consumers71 or
those against peddling liquor.74
A rational approach to the problem of promoting temperate drinking is
evidenced by the variegated treatment of beverages of differing alcoholic con-
tent. In general fewer restraints have been placed on the sale of the weaker bev-
erages such as wine of lower alcoholic content and beer,75 presumably on the
theory that the greater ease with which these beverages can be obtained will be
reflected in larger numbers of drinkers who will satisfy their thirsts together with
the gregarious instinct, by consuming the more innocuous beverages. Although
as a rule licenses issued for consumption on the premises of the stronger beverages
include the right to sell the weaker drinks, it is not uncommon to grant licenses
for the sale of wine and beer under less stringent requirements as to method of
sale or character of the premises where they are sold, and at a lower license fee.
Many of these states, in fact, have established a graduated scale of license fees
based on the comparative alcoholic strength of the various beverages to be sold.76
66. This ranges from 5 gallons in California (commission regulation) to i quart in
Delaware (§ 16). The Connecticut statute (§ 688b) curiously provides that not less than i
quart may be bought at one time. In Oregon (§ 6) the commission has the power to regulate
the quantity which may be purchased at any one time.
67. New York is included among the states. (See § 54)
68. Indiana (§ 3734), Missouri (§ 22) and New Mexico (§ 5). In Missouri the merchant
must have a stock of other merchandise of a value in excess of $1,5oo.
69. Massachusetts (§ 24), Minnesota (§ 3200-23), Ohio (§ 6064-3), Oregon (§ 6) and
Virginia (§ 4).
7o. Delaware (§ 9-no poster advertising except for beer and wine) ; Montana (§ 64-
only in newspapers and periodicals except by commission. Prices may not be quoted in ad-
vertisement) ; Washington (§ 43-no advertisement by the commission).
71. Montana (§ 64), for example, prohibits the display of signs containing the words bar,
barroom, saloon, tavern, wine, spirits, liquors or words of like import.
72. Delaware (§ 9).
73. Maryland (§ 26) and Washington (§ 42).
74. Massachusetts (§ 32), Pennsylvania (§ 744-6o2h).
75. The following states allow only package sales of strong liquors but permit sales ior
consumption of wine and beer on the premises of licensed establishments: California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Indiana, New Mexico, Oregon, Virginia and Washington. Iowa stands alone
in permitting only "on-sales" qf beer.
76. In Massachusetts (§ 15), for example, license fees for the sale of all liquor range
between $25o and $2,500, while licenses for the sale of beer and wine range between $oo
and $I,ooo.
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The most striking development along these lines has been the widespread encour-
agement of the tavern or "beer-garden", as a substitute for the saloon.
7 7
Statutes of all types have uniformly attempted to provide safeguards
against the recurrence of the once solidly intrenched control by the large liquor
interests of the retail outlets, with the attendant pressure upon the retailer to
increase sales volume at any cost in order to placate the manufacturers to whom
he had become financially obligated. Statutes commonly forbid persons who
hold any financial interest in manufacturing or wholesale licenses from ac-
quiring any interest, direct or indirect, in retail establishments by contributing
to the cost of the license, advancing money as a loan or gift or acting as surety
or in the character of pledgee for a retail licensee.78 Also prohibited are ac-
quisitions by the upper classes in the liquor hierarchy of financial interests in
the premises occupied by retail licensees through ownership, mortgage or lien.
Other provisions falling within this category preclude the furnishing of equip-
ment, supplies or fixtures; or even signs or other display material in excess of
a given value.79  Generally outlawed is the notorious "tied-house" contracts
by which a retailer bound himself to dispense the products of a particular
manufacturer exclusive of all others in return for favors granted him, fre-
quently assuming the form of protection against political interference with his
establishment or, alternately, the guarantee of the renewal of his license. Closely
related provisions prohibit owners of any one type of license to acquire an
interest in a license of another type. Presumably for the purpose of curtailing
the development of powerful liquor combines as well as the discouragement of in-
temperate consumption many statutes have limited the number of licenses which
can be granted to a particular person or corporation. 8' Worthy of mention in
this regard are two statutes which specifically prohibit the licensing of chain
liquor stores.82 In an endeavor to prevent a recurrence of the pre-prohibition
alliance between politics and the liquor interests sharply barbed provisions in
Illinois and Oregon cause the licenses of retail dealers to be revoked where such
licensee contributes to political campaign funds or lends his support to the
candidacy of a particular aspirant to office.
83
In conjunction with the multitude of provisions enacted to regulate the
conduct of retail dispensaries there are various restrictions placed upon the
right of the individual citizen to purchase or drink liquor. Most statutes pro-
hibit sales to minors (the age limit is relaxed to some degree in the case of
beer), intoxicated persons, habitual drunkards and interdicted persons. Other
statutes include persons receiving public relief,84 insane persons, women in
77. See statutes in Connecticut (§ 67ob), Delaware (§ i7), Michigan (§ 2), Rhode
Island (§ 5) and Washington (§ 3). These are designated as "taverns" in all but Rhode
Island.
78. In connection with this type of provision the Pennsylvania act (§ 744-6ogd) pro-
vides that "the purpose of this section is to require a separation of the financial and business
interests between manufacturers and holders of hotel and restaurant licenses . . . and no
person shall, by any device whatsoever, directly or indirectly, evade the provisions of this
section."
79. In Illinois (§ 5) the manufacturer may not give the retailer, during any one year, any
signs or display material exceeding an aggregate value of $ioo. This limit is set at $25 in
Wisconsin (§ 176-7), and $5 in Maryland (§ 28).
8o. Minnesota (§ 3200-27), Missouri (§ 3) and New York (§ Ioi) specifically outlaw
this type of agreement.
81. For example, no more than three off-sale licenses nor more than one manufacturer's,
wholesaler's or importer's license can be held by any one person or group of persons in Mas-
sachusetts (§ 15).
82. Colorado (§21) and Rhode Island (§ 6).
83. Illinois (§ 12a) and Oregon (§ 33).
84. The statute of Massachusetts (§ 69) is among those which contain this restriction.
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Massachusetts taverns, Arizona bar maids while on duty, and Indians. In
addition, many statutes fix the maximum amount of liquor which can be pur-
chased at one time or over a period of time, and in keeping with the greater
liberality allowed in the case of beer and wine, fix the maximum for these
beverages at a correspondingly higher figure.8 5 In five states, 8 all under the
monopoly plan of control, and composed of a preponderantly rural population,
a further restriction is imposed upon the person in the form of an individual
purchasing permit. Under this requirement it is possible to effect a stringent
enforcement of the various individual restrictions since such permit must be
presented at the state dispensary at every purchase and will be revoked for
violations of the liquor laws. Nor may these permits be transferred or used to
purchase for another person.
Liquor legislation on the whole represents the result of many compromises
among the various interests concerned in the liquor traffic. In no other phase
of legislation on the subject, however, is this more apparent than in the com-
pletely jumbled state of the taxing provisions. Fighting for low taxes is the
ultimate consumer, those interested in larger sales and, most important of all
at the present stage, those who wish to combat the bootlegger effectively. Both
the prohibitionist and the taxing authorities, although impelled by unrelated
reasons, seek high taxes. An excise tax is levied both by federal and state
authorities, and in many states local authorities are permitted to duplicate taxes
levied by the state. In general, both license and excise taxes vary with the
alcoholic strength of the beverage to be sold or manufactured, although there
is little relation between fees charged for licenses of the same type in different
states. Manufacturer's licenses vary with the type of liquor to be manufactured
as well as the capacity of the plant or the amount manufactured. Retail licenses
frequently vary with the population of the locality. It is interesting to note
that in some few states the interest of the state in revenue has been effectively
combined with the desire to control private profit to some extent by the utiliza-
tion of excess profit taxes," although this method of taxation can hardly be
said to constitute an effective deterrent upon the desire to increase liquor sales.
Another point of interest to those who want effective control of the liquor
traffic is the practice of allocating revenue to be received to various purposes.
When viewed in the light of the express purposes of most statutes to increase
temperance in the use of liquor this type of provision seems anomalous since it
serves only to create groups of people who will be interested only in increased
consumption in order to increase revenue.
Of primary importance under any system of control is the uniformly
incorporated provision for local option. Although an integral part of liquor
control statutes before national prohibition, the right of voters in small sections
of the state to determine whether their community shall be "wet" or "dry"
assumes an added significance in view of the widespread belief that an im-
portant factor in the downfall of national prohibition was the failure to reckon
with the diversified tastes of a heterogeneous population. This reasoning ap-
plies equally to the possibility of variation within a single state. In few statutes,
85. Delaware (§ 37) allows the purchase at one time of one bottle of spirits or twelve bot-
tes of beer or wine; Indiana (§ 3743) four quarts of spirits and twenty-four bottles of wine
or beer.
86. Iowa (§20), Montana (§§ I8-27), New Mexico (§8), Oregon (§26) and Washing-
ton (§ 12). The provision for a purchasing permit has been repealed, however, in New
Mexico [see N. M. Laws (1934) c. 30, § 8]. Delaware (§ 37) requires a special permit in
order to purchase liquor in excess of the maximum amount allowed.
87. Ohio (§ 43) has utilized this form of taxation in regard to the stronger liquors, al-
though not with respect to wine and beer. Rhode Island (§ 49) limits the profits of whole-
salers to 9% on the amount invested.
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however, has any attempt been made to base the local option districts upon
anything other than the usual political units-the county, city or town. The
fact that the composition of a large urban unit may be as diversified in com-
position as an entire state is disregarded under this classification. The Wis-
consin statute8 offers a remedy for this apparent weakness by providing for
local option divisions of small, compact groups of people composed of not less
than one hundred nor more than seven hundred and fifty electors residing in a
small residential area. Under this classification a wet or dry unit will represent
more truly the desires of a homogeneous group, and will thereby lay the founda-
tion of popular respect and obedience to law as chosen by the members of the
community. While some statutes merely give the local voters the option of
registering a choice between the system of liquor sales as prescribed by the
statute or complete prohibition,89 others allow the members of the community
some latitude in determining a system which will be suited to their particular
desires and habits. ° In still others an attempt has been made to provide for the
desires of the irreconcilable wet minority by permitting, under any state of
the local law, the importation of liquor for personal use.91 This type of pro-
vision frankly recognizes the fact, learned through bitter experience during
national prohibition, that people who desire intoxicating liquor will satisfy that
desire extra-legally if not permitted to do so under the law. Provisions regarding
the frequency with which local option elections may be held, and the time for
holding such elections, reveal in some quarters the recognized necessity of
divorcing the influence of politics from the liquor problem. While some
statutes tend to cement the bond between the two by making it mandatory that
the issue be voted upon at every general election,9 2 more enlightened statutes
have stipulated that the popular choice should not be registered at the same
time as a general election, and then only after a petition by a fixed percentage
of the voters of the community." As a precaution against continual agitation
of the question it is frequently stipulated that there be no reconsideration of
the matter for a fixed period of years.94
Many persuasive arguments can be advanced as to the relative merits or
defects of the systems of control which have been adopted in the respective
states, or in regard to the various single provisions which aim at the elimination
of a particular abuse associated with the liquor traffic. Much can be said, too,
of the relative ease or difficulty attendant upon the enforcement of the in-
numerable statutory requirements. But of even greater portent in any attempt
to forecast the success or failure of a particular control system is the popular
reaction to the restrictions and conditions placed upon the sale of liquor to the
88. §§ 176.20-176.25.
89. Michigan (§ 56) allows a referendum to decide only whether or not strong liquor
will be permitted in that community. Minnesota (§ 35) permits only a choice between the
two extremes.
go. Massachusetts awards spirituous and light liquors a separate place on the ballot. Ohio
(§ 3138) permits the voters to vote separately on state dispensaries and private licenses.
Pennsylvania permits the voters to prohibit only private licenses.
91. Washington (§ 83).
92. Massachusetts' ballots, at every general election, contain a space in which voters are
to register their preferences (§ ii). Oregon (§§ 41, 43) allows a local option vote at any gen-
eral election upon petition by io% of the voters.
93. Illinois [art. IV (25% petition) forty-seven months must elapse before the question
can be resubmitted to the voters] ; Minnesota (§ 35; local option election must be removed
from the general election by one month) ; Missouri Q 44a-I ; sixty days, so that it "shall be
separate and distinct from any other election whatever").
94. Kentucky (art. VIII, three years) ; Michigan (§ 56, four years) ; Minnesota (§ 35,
three years) ; New Jersey (§ 41, three years) ; New Mexico (§ 3, four years) ; New York
(§ 147, every third general election) ; Pennsylvania (§ 744-501, on election days every four
3 ears).
LEGISLATION
ultimate consumer. That a statute will be practically nullified when it does not
approximate the desires of large groups of people becomes an obvious fact
when viewed in the light of vigorous growth of the illegal liquor traffic during
national prohibition. The success or failure, therefore, of a particular statute
will hinge upon the degree to which it receives popular support, and this will
depend in turn upon the willingness of large groups of people to cooperate in
the movement toward social control. Thus it would seem a matter of vital
importance that there be incorporated in any type of statute measures aimed
at educating the populace along these lines. The lawmakers, however, have
exhibited little foresight in this matter. The section of the Minnesota statute 1,
which provides for instruction in the public schools on the effect of alcohol
upon the human system and upon society in general, and, at the same time,
declares a policy of regulating advertising so that the effects of the educational
plan will not be neutralized, is to be commended. Unfortunately, it stands
quite alone among the statutes.
C. JF.
APPENDIX *
Arkansas Acts Spec. Sess. 1933-1934, no. 7.
CAL. CODE (Deering, Supp. I933) tit. 278.
Col. Sess. Laws Spec. Sess. 1933, c. 12.
CONN. GEN. STAT. (Supp. 1933) c. 151.
Del. Laws 1933, c. I8.
Ill. Laws Spec. Sess. 1933-1934, no. 9.
IND. STAT. ANN. (Baldwin, 1934) c. 12.
Iowa Laws Spec. Sess. J934, c. 24, 25 (beer act).
Ky. Acts i934, c. 146.
La. Acts 1934, no. i5, amended, Spec. Sess. 1934, no. 15.
Md. Laws Spec. Sess. 1933, c. 2.
Mass. Laws Spec. Sess. 1933, c. 375-
Mich. Laws Spec. Sess. 1933, no. 8.
MINN. STAT. (Mason Supp., 1934) c. i6.
Miss. Laws 1934, c. 171, 172, 173.
Mo. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1934) c. 31.
Mont. Laws 1933, c. 105.
N. J. Laws 1933, c. 434, 436.
N. M. Laws 1933, c. 159, amended, Laws 1934, c. 30.
N. Y. CoNs. LAWS (Supp. 1934) c. 2a.
Ou1o CODE ANN. (Throckmorton, Baldwin's ed. Supp. 1934) § 6o64.
Ore. Laws 2d Spec. Sess. 1933, c. 17.
PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon Supp. April, 1934) tit. 47.
R. I. Laws 1933, c. 2013.
Vt. Laws Spec. Sess. 1934, no. I.
Va. Acts 1934, c. 94.
Wash. Laws Spec. Sess. 1933, c. 62.
Wis. Laws Spec: Sess. 1933-1934, c. 13.
* The texts of the statutes of Mainc and New Hampshire were not available. For a brief
r~sum of the liquor situation as it existed in each state on Dec. 5, 1934, see Phila. Public
Ledger, Dec. 5, 1934, at 4.
95. § 3200-29.
